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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to discuss and apply the principle of proportionality 
(PoP) to the War on Terror (WoT). For this, vital characteristics and con-
ditions of the PoP will be discussed in great detail. The paper argues that 
notions of the “just cause,” the “reasonable hope of success,” and the “re-
quirement of the last resort” are incorporated within the PoP. This paper 
also defines how the harm caused by military actions is weighed against the 
direct military advantage to arrive at conclusions on the proportionality or 
disproportionality of an attack. After discussing the theoretical grounds of 
the PoP, this paper tries to apply the PoP to the WoT, most particularly in 
the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. This paper is an attempt to calcu-
late the damage caused by the direct or reverberating effects of these wars, 
by considering the costs casualties, and effects of these wars on terrorism, 
to check their efficacy and achievements against their military objectives. 
This paper concludes that the destruction caused by these wars greatly 
outweighs the military advantages they have achieved. For instance, sever-
al countries have been destabilized and destroyed. Millions of people have 
been killed and millions more have been displaced. The infrastructure and 
the economies of these countries have been devastated. As regime change 
agendas have been pursued, rebels have been given arms and support to 
fight their own states. All of these have contributed to the rise of destabili-
zation, violence, and terrorism in these regions, which exceeds the military 
objectives. These wars have been proven to be inefficient and counterpro-
ductive. The military objective of the WoT was to decrease terrorism but 
terrorism has significantly increased, which was reasonably foreseeable 
owing to past experiences. Therefore, this paper concludes that these wars 
can be considered disproportionate to their direct military advantage. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The world has been in a state of war for seventeen years, since the events 
of 9/11 in 2001.1 The War on Terror (WoT) was started to decrease terror-
ism, to fight terrorist threats, and to increase the security of the Western 
world.2 However, after seventeen years of war at a cost of more than 4.4 
                                                
1 See Massoumeh Torfeh, No End in Sight 17 Years After US Invasion of Afghani-
stan, TRT WORLD (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.trtworld.com/asia/no-end-in-sight-
17-years-after-us-invasion-of-afghanistan-20818. 
2 See “War on Terrorism,” GLOBAL POL’Y F., https://www.globalpolicy.org/war-
on-terrorism.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2019); see generally Authorization for Use 
of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Congress, (2001) (authorizing the initial use 
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trillion dollars,3 the humanitarian crises due to this war have been beyond 
expectations. The WoT has caused the deaths of millions of innocent civil-
ians,4 the destruction of several countries, and the displacement of millions 
more in the migrant crises.5 It has destabilized several regions, and terror-
ism and violence have counterproductively increased.6 The security of the 
Western world has not improved; instead it has deteriorated.7 Terrorism is 
on the rise, with the formation of new terrorist organizations every year.8 
However, the war has no end in sight.9 New conflicts and new invasions in 
more countries are planned and executed even after seventeen years of the 
WoT.10 Scholars believe that by now we should have learned our lesson 
                                                                                                             
of military force in what became known as the “War on Terror”). 
3 Mehdi Hasan, Reality Check: The Failure of the “War on Terror,” AL JAZEERA 
(Sept. 12, 2015), https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/2015/09/reality-
check-failure-war-terror-150911151414017.html. 
4 See Nafeez Mossadeq Ahmed, Unworthy Victims: Western Wars Have Killed 
Four Million Muslims Since 1990, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Apr. 8, 2015), 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/unworthy-victims-western-wars-have-
killed-four-million-muslims-1990. 
5 See Afghan Citizens, BROWN U., 
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/afghan (last visited Feb. 
10, 2019) (stating that “the war in Afghanistan continues destroying lives, due to 
the direct consequences of violence and the war-induced breakdown of public 
health, security, and infrastructure”); see also Anthony H. Cordesman, Syria: When 
and How Does This War End?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Apr. 10, 
2018), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/180410Syria_When_War_End.Clean_Version.pdf (describing 
statistics of displaced citizens as a result of war in the Middle East); Consequences 
of the War and Occupation of Iraq, GLOBAL POL’Y F., 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/humanitarian-issues-in-iraq/consequences-of-the-
war-and-occupation-of-iraq.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (explaining that, 
“though Saddam Hussein did not use weapons of mass destruction nor set fire to 
Iraq's oil fields nor attack Israel with rockets, and though the conflict was relatively 
short, the war has had many serious results ranging from death and destruction in 
Iraq to regional instability to a weakened world economy”); Impact of Afghani-
stan’s Fourth Consecutive Year of War on Civilians “Far Too High,” UN NEWS 
(Feb. 25, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/02/1003521 (stating that “‘the 
human cost of this ugly war in Afghanistan – loss of life, destruction and immense 
suffering – is far too high’”). 
6 A. TREVOR THRALL & ERIK GOEPNER, CATO INST., STEP BACK: LESSONS FOR U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE FAILED WAR ON TERROR 1, 9 (2017), 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-814.pdf. 
7 See Shirley Williams, The Seeds of Iraq’s Future Terror, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 
2003), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/28/iraq.politics. 
8 See generally Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 
DEP’T STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last visited Feb. 
8, 2019) (listing Foreign Terrorist Organizations recognized by the Secretary of 
State, as well as their dates of designation). 
9 See Torfeh, supra note 1.  
10 See Message to Congress on Submitting Proposed Legislation to Authorize the 
Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Ter-
rorist Organization, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 93 (Feb. 11, 2015). 
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from previous invasions, and that the WoT is inefficient and counterproduc-
tive.11 Therefore, to analyze the destruction caused by this war in contrast to 
its military advantages, this paper attempts to calculate the war’s propor-
tionality. For this, the destruction caused by the war will be compared with 
the military objectives achieved by it. 
This paper is divided into two main parts. Part I will theoretically discuss 
the principle of proportionality (PoP). This part will explain the general 
characteristics of the PoP, will analyze military advantage under the PoP, 
will discuss the “harm caused” under the PoP, and will describe the mecha-
nism of weighing the harm caused against the military advantage, to arrive 
at conclusions on the proportionality or disproportionality of an attack. 
Then, Part II will discuss the WoT and the destruction caused by it in addi-
tion to the application of the PoP. Part II will apply the PoP to the Afghani-
stan War, the Iraq War, and the war in Syria. Ultimately, this paper will 
conclude that the harm and destruction caused by the WoT outweighs the 
benefits that military action has achieved. 
I.  PROPORTIONALITY 
Just war theory sets out the foundations of the conditions for fighting a 
just war.12 Violating these conditions is considered wrong. However, the 
severity of the wrong done depends on the importance of the violated con-
dition and the severity of the extent of this violation. These conditions are 
divided into two general groups: jus ad bellum and jus in bello.13 Jus ad 
bellum is the laws of war that are concerned with the justifiability and rea-
sonableness of resorting to the use of force.14 These laws analyze whether a 
war itself is just or not. For this, a war must be entered into as a last resort, 
with a declaration of war by a legitimate authority, with a reasonable hope 
of success, and with the right intention.15 For instance, a war in self-defense 
to thwart aggression is considered to be a just reason to fight a war.16 How-
ever, a legitimate cause to fight a war does not allow the disregard of jus ad 
                                                
11 THRALL & GOEPNER, supra note 6, at 2. 
12 Peter M. Asaro, How Just Could A Robot War Be?, in CURRENT ISSUES IN 
COMPUTING AND PHILOSOPHY 50, 53 (Adam Briggle et al. eds., 2008). 
13 Helen Frowe, The Just War Framework, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICS 
OF WAR 41, 41 (Seth Lazar & Helen Frowe eds., 2018). 
14 Gregory Reichberg, Legitimate Authority, Just Cause, and the Decision to Invade 
Iraq, in 1 ETHICS, LAW, AND SOCIETY 243, 243 (Jennifer Gunning & Søren Holmes 
eds., 2005). 
15 CHARLES JONES, MORE THAN JUST WAR 79 (2013). 
16 Suzzane Uniacke, Self-Defence, Just War, and a Reasonable Prospect of Suc-
cess, in HOW WE FIGHT: ETHICS IN WAR 62, 62 (Helen Frowe & Gerald Lang eds., 
2014) (explaining that thwarting aggression is a just reason so long as the use of 
force is necessary and proportionate). 
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bellum conditions of international humanitarian law (IHL).17 Jus in bello, 
on the other hand, is the laws of war that are concerned with the conduct of 
a war.18 These laws include the evaluation of war activities with the scope 
of humanitarian laws.19 For instance, jus in bello includes the principles of 
necessity, distinction, and proportionality.20 The principle of necessity 
mandates that military action must only be taken as a last resort, assuring 
that it is not taken unnecessarily and without exhausting all peaceful 
means.21 The principle of distinction mandates that military action in a war 
must only target combatants and should not deliberately target civilians or 
civilian property.22 The PoP mandates that the damage caused by military 
action must not exceed its military objectives, such that the harm done by a 
war is not greater than the relevant good it achieves.23 Within proportionali-
ty, it is forbidden under the law of war to cause excessive destruction or 
killings that serve no military purpose or are disproportionate to the relevant 
good expected to be achieved from it.24 
The PoP is included in the humanitarian laws of war under Additional 
Protocol I 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (API of GC).25 It for-
bids military attacks “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of ci-
vilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct mil-
itary advantage anticipated.”26 
                                                
17 See What Are Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello?, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS 
(Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-ad-bellum-and-jus-
bello-0. 
18 Frowe, supra note 13. 
19 What Are Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello?, supra note 17.  
20 See Asaro, supra note 12.  
21 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protecting of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 11, 
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions Protocol I]; TOM 
RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER 518 (2010). 
22 Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 48; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protecting of Vic-
tims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 13, Dec. 12, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions Protocol II]; ANICEE VAN 
ENGELAND, CIVILIAN OR COMBATANT?: A CHALLENGE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 28 
(2011). 
23 Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 51(4). 
24 See id. at art. 57(2)(a).  
25 Id. at art. 51(4), art. 57(2)(a).   
26 Id.  
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A. Conditions and Characteristics 
There are numerous conditions and characteristics of proportionality. 
However, this paper is only concerned with the three main conditions and 
characteristics: collateral damage, hope of success, and last resort. 
1.  Collateral Damage 
It is worth noting here that the Geneva Convention (GC) discusses unin-
tentional collateral damage to civilians and property under the PoP.27 Inten-
tional damage to civilians and property is otherwise forbidden under the 
principle of distinction.28 The PoP forbids “incidental” collateral damage 
against civilians and property that exceed the direct military advantage.29 
However, it does allow the death of civilians as collateral damage if the di-
rect military advantage is bigger than the damage caused.30 For instance, 
the PoP allows the death of a few civilians in a bomb attack on a building 
full of terrorists, if it would avoid the death of thousands of civilians at the 
hands of the terrorists targeted. However, it would not allow the targeting 
and killing of thousands of civilians in a military action against one terror-
ist; the military goal in this example is so trivial as compared to the exces-
sive damage triggered by this action. 
2. Hope of Success 
If applied properly, the PoP can also incorporate other conditions of just 
war theory, such as the “reasonable hope of success” criterion,31 which a 
war will violate if it has no chance of achieving any good.32 But such a war 
also violates the PoP because the destruction is unnecessarily excessive and 
serves no military purpose.33 Thus, a war with no hope of success is bound 
to be disproportionate.34 A similar statement is also true for a war where the 
probability of expected benefit is low, because a lower probability of ex-
pected benefit makes the harm incurred as a result of military actions exces-
                                                
27 Id.  
28 Id. at art. 48; Geneva Conventions Protocol II, supra note 22. 
29 Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 51(5)(b), art. 57(2)(a).  
30 KAREN HULME, WAR TORN ENVIRONMENT 127 (2004). 
31 JONES, supra note 15. 
32 Dr. Jeff McMahan, Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale Ctr. for Ethical Leadership, 
U.S. Naval Acad., The 2008 William C. Stutt Ethics Lecture, What Makes an Act 
of War Disproportionate? 16 (Mar. 25, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://jeffersonmcmahan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Stutt-lecture.pdf). 
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
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sive.35 Some scholars rightly believe that the reasonable hope of success 
condition is not applicable in situations where a small country is defending 
itself against the aggression of a superpower because in such a situation a 
small state is justified in defending itself even without having any hope of 
success.36 The actual reasonable hope of success condition limits the ex-
cesses of war against vague military objectives.37 For instance, fighting a 
unilateral war against all terrorists of the world without the consent of the 
host states can be considered a vague military objective, which seems to 
have no limits whatsoever. So, the military campaign to execute this objec-
tive can cause excessive destruction and unnecessary deaths without achiev-
ing substantial goals. In the WoT, the war is fought against all terrorists.38 
However, there is no authoritative person who can sign a peace treaty or 
surrender to end the WoT.39 This means that the WoT will have no end, be-
cause the goals are so vague.40 Therefore, the WoT does not satisfy the rea-
sonable hope of success condition41 and cannot be considered a just war 
under the PoP. 
3. Last Resort 
Similarly, the PoP can also incorporate the condition of necessity, which 
is the condition of last resort.42 For instance, consider that certain military 
actions achieve military objectives that could have been equally achievable 
by diplomatic negotiations. Here, the destruction caused by the military ac-
tion may be proportionate to the military objectives, but it was not propor-
tionate in light of the diplomatic measures that could have been taken in-
stead of the military action.43 The destruction here is caused unnecessarily 
and in excess to what could have been reasonably achieved diplomatical-
ly.44 In the Oil Platform Case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) estab-
                                                
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 17.  
37 See JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 72 (2009); Jeff McMahan, Propor-
tionate Defense, in WEIGHING LIVES IN WAR 139 (2017). 
38 See “War on Terrorism,” supra note 2.  
39 See William J. Chambliss & Mark D. H. Nelemans, Transnational Organized 
Crime, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 58 (Fe-
lia Allum & Stan Gilmore eds., 2012). 
40 See id.  
41 See McMahan, supra note 32, at 16–17. 
42 Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality of War, in DRAWING MORALS: 
ESSAYS IN ETHICAL THEORY 238, 241 (2011). 
43 Harry van der Linden, Just War Theory and U.S. Military Hegemony, in 
RETHINKING THE JUST WAR TRADITION 53, 68–69 (Henry van der Linden et al. 
eds., 2012). 
44 See id. 
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lished that the principles of proportionality and necessity are interlinked be-
cause a war or an attack cannot be proportional if it is unnecessary.45 Under 
the principle of necessity, proportionality requires that only the least 
amount of force necessary for self-defense can be used to thwart an attack 
by the aggressors.46 
By contrast, the simple proportionality condition is the calculation of 
good versus evil produced by a war, from the baseline of doing nothing or 
continuing a war without just cause.47 This produces a result for whether 
the outcome of a war has achieved more good or more evil compared to its 
alternatives and justifiability.48 Within this analysis, the just war conditions 
of “necessity,” “just cause,” “last resort,” and “reasonable hope of success” 
are compared to the net effects of the war and its alternatives.49 By incorpo-
rating the last resort principle under the PoP, the “killing of the innocent in 
war can be licit only when it is done either accidently or unintentionally 
(i.e., foreseen but not intended), but even then it is licit only where there is 
no alternative to it.”50 
However, in the subjective and objective tests of proportionality the re-
sults can be different for the same war. For instance, it is possible that a war 
is disproportionate because of its evil excesses and the little relevant benefit 
achieved, while the actions of a military person may be proportional to the 
facts at hand. The opposite is also possible.51 But in an overall calculation, 
if the harm done by the war is more than that of a good caused by it, then it 
is deemed to be disproportionate.52 This raises three relevant questions: 1) 
What is considered a relevant good or the “direct military advantage” in a 
war?; 2) What is considered the “harm caused” by a war?; and 3) How can 
military advantage be weighed against the harm caused to calculate the “ex-
cessive damage” or the proportionality of a war?  
                                                
45 See Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Advisory Opinion and Or-
ders, 2003 I.C.J. No. 90, ¶ 76, ¶ 77 (Nov. 6). 
46 See JIMMY GURULE & GEOFFREY CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM 
LAW 69–70 (2011). 
47 Hurka, supra note 42.  
48 Id.  
49 JONES, supra note 15.  
50 C.A.J. Coady, Bombing and the Morality of War, in BOMBING CIVILIANS 209 
(Yuki Tanaka & Marilyn B. Young eds., 2009). 
51 Hurka, supra note 42.  
52 Id.  
8
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B. Military Advantage 
The PoP is a “quasi-consequentialist” principle that weighs the good and 
evil caused by the war or by the military actions.53 If the evil caused by a 
war is greater than the good caused by it, then such a war is considered to 
be disproportionate.54 Similarly, if the benefit of a war is greater than the 
harm caused then the war is considered to be proportionate.55 James J. 
Johnson, a renowned legalist, agrees that for a war to be proportional it is 
vital that the relevant good outweighs the harm caused by it.56 In addition, it 
is also essential that a war is for a just cause to be proportional.57 This 
means that a proportionate war, where the relevant good has outweighed the 
harm caused, can still be disproportionate if it is fought without legal basis 
or without just cause.58 Because the military objective achieved in an unjust 
war must be aggressive and unjust in nature, it cannot be measured as a 
benefit but only as an evil.59 
A relevant good under the PoP is the “direct military advantage”60 
achieved by the war. Therefore, all the just causes and aims for a war are a 
relevant good that can or cannot be achieved through a war, whereas all the 
indirect advantages such as the economic benefits of a war cannot be con-
sidered a relevant good.61 However, economic harm can be considered a 
relevant harm or relevant evil in a war.62 For instance in the WoT, since the 
just cause and military advantage were to eliminate terrorism,63 the defeat 
of terrorists is a relevant good in the WoT. Similarly, resisting aggression, 
deterring aggression, and disarming the enemy are just causes, and therefore 
can be considered relevant goods in a war.64 However, it is pertinent to note 
that, if the causation or aim of a war is not aligned with the international 
                                                
53 Id. at 242.  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, MORALITY AND CONTEMPORARY WARFARE, 27–28 
(1999); see also JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, CAN MODERN WAR BE JUST? 3, 25, 62 
(1984); JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF 
WAR 204 (1981). 
57 See PETER A. FRENCH, WAR AND MORAL DISSONANCE 315 (2011). 
58 See id. (citing Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 34 PHILOSOPHIA 23, 
28 (2006)). 
59 See id. 
60 Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 51, art. 57(2)(a)(iii), art. 
57(2)(b).  
61 Hurka, supra note 42, at 247. 
62 Id.  
63 Letter from Barack Obama, U.S. President, to the U.S. Congress (Feb. 11, 2015) 
(on file with author). 
64 Jeff McMahan, Just Cause for War, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 1, 2, 3, 4 (2005).  
9
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law of using force, then a cause cannot be just.65 Therefore, it cannot be 
considered a relevant good. For instance, the international law of using 
force does not allow the retaliatory use of force against nonstate actors66 
without Unites Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization.67 The only 
justified uses of forces are in self-defense and with UNSC authorization.68 
International law does not allow the preemptive use of force69 or humanitar-
ian intervention without UNSC authorization.70 Moreover, the law does not 
allow supporting rebels in another country by providing them arms.71 
Therefore, any actions taken against the international law of using force will 
be considered disproportionate regardless of its causation or aims. For in-
stance, the Israeli attacks on the Osirik Nuclear Reactor were preemptive in 
nature, and therefore disproportionate.72 Moreover, if the actions of war do 
not produce any relevant good, then these actions can never be proportion-
al.73  
Contrary to the wording of the definition of proportionality in the GC 
protocols,74 Thomas Hukra argues that a contributory good can also be a 
relevant good in a war.75 For instance, the liberation of women in Afghan 
war can be considered a relevant good, even though it was not a direct mili-
tary objective.76 However, this paper maintains that, since the definition of 
proportionality explicitly includes “direct military advantage”77 within the 
relevant good, a contributory or incidental good cannot be considered a rel-
evant good in a war78 when calculating the proportionality of a war. 
                                                
65 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
66 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 211 (June 27) (stating that self-defense is 
not allowed against a neutral state in response to an armed attack by non-state ac-
tors, so long as the attack was not directed by a state. If a state orchestrated an 
armed attack through non-state actors, then there is a right to self-defense against 
such a state).  
67 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 39–42; U.N. Charter art. 51. 
68 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 39–42; U.N. Charter art. 51. 
69 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 23; see U.N. Charter art. 39-42; U.N. Charter art. 
51. 
70 JANA DADOVA, THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION WITHOUT UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZATION 6 (2016).  
71 See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 195. 
72 SHIRLEY V. SCOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 136 
(2009). 
73 FRENCH, supra note 57.  
74 Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 49. 
75 See Hurka, supra note 42, at 40–45. 
76 See id. 
77 Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 51(5)(b).  
78 See, e.g., LINA ABIRAFEH, GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL AID IN AFGHANISTAN: 
THE POLITICS AND EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION 51 (2009) (indicating that consider-
10
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C.  Harm Caused 
Material harm under proportionality is the loss of civilian lives, injury to 
civilians, or damage to civilian objects in excess of the direct military ad-
vantage.79 Harm to civilian objects considers dysfunctional civilian objects 
and environmental damage.80 Injury to civilians also includes illnesses and 
people’s mental illnesses.81 The principle of distinction forbids the direct 
and indiscriminate targeting of civilians and their property, and allows the 
pursuit of only military objectives.82 This law requires some level of likeli-
hood to hit the target.83 For instance, random or blind firing without pre-
cisely targeting any military objects in populated areas is an example of an 
indiscriminate attack.84 
 In addition to direct damage to civilians, economic loss and instability in 
the region also come within the definition of incidental harm under the 
PoP.85 In fact, all incidental harm and normal harm of war come under the 
purview of proportionality.86 For instance, damage to infrastructure, loss to 
the economy, death toll of civilians, damage to civilian property,87 instabil-
ity in governance, the rise of rebellions, the rise of terrorism or violence, 
damage to the environment,88 decline of health care, refugee and migration 
crises, famine, and sanctions can be considered incidental harms. If any of 
these harms are incidentally caused by a war, they can be considered inci-
                                                                                                             
ing women’s rights as a military objective means targeting all Afghan men). 
79 Isabel Robinson & Ellen Nohle, Proportionality and Precautions in Attack: The 
Reverberating Effects of Using Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, 98 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 107, 129 (2016). 
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Geneva Convetions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 51(4)(b); JEAN-MARIE 
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 38–39 (2005); A. P. V. 
ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 23 (2004). 
83 See ROGERS, supra note 82, at 24. 
84 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 118–19 (2004). 
85 Hurka, supra note 42, at 247. 
86 WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY & WOLFF HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, THE LAW OF WAR: 
A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL 446 (2018). 
87 Laurent Gisel, Relevant Incidental Harm for the Proportionality Principle, 16 
BRUGES COLLOQUIUM URB. WARFARE 118, 124–25 (2015). 
88 See Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: 
Enemy Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict and the Struggle for a Moral 
High Ground, 56 AIR FORCE L. REV. 1, 90 (2005) (citing CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT 
CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING COLLATERAL DAMAGE 
AND CASUALTIES FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, CJCSM 3160.01A (Draft) A-4 
(2004)). 
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dental harm under the PoP.89 In this regard, Norway has expressed its sup-
port of the inclusion of the long-term effects of war within proportionali-
ty.90 The report on the United Kingdom’s (UK) intervention in Iraq has also 
suggested the same: that, in addition to the direct damage to civilians and 
their property, the indirect economic and health costs must also be calculat-
ed within proportionality.91 Likewise, numerous states including the Czech 
Republic, Brazil, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, New Zealand, Austria,92 
and Ireland93 have explicitly supported the inclusion of the long-term reper-
cussions of military action in the calculation of damage caused under the 
PoP. 
1. Reverberating Effects 
Similarly, IHL may implicitly prohibit the use of explosive weapons with 
mass effects94 in populated areas95 under the PoP and the principle of pre-
caution because their effects are less visible but cause greater damage to ci-
vilians.96 Their effects include damage to civilian houses, electric systems, 
sewage systems, health services, water supplies, and civilian displace-
ment.97 Therefore, states and commentators agree that it is a legal obliga-
tion to foresee these reverberating effects and take precautionary measures 
during military activities.98 Reverberating effects are the damages that do 
                                                
89 See Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 128–29. 
90 Memorandum to CCW Delegates on States Parties’ Responses to “International 
Humanitarian Law and ERW” Questionnaire 5 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter States Par-
ties’ Responses to “International Humanitarian Law and ERW” Questionnaire] (on 
file with author). 
91 See COMM. OF PRIVY COUNCILLORS, REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY, 2016-17, HC 
265-XII, at 181 (UK).  
92 States Parties’ Responses to “International Humanitarian Law and ERW” Ques-
tionnaire, supra note 90 (noting that Czech Republic did not explicitly agree but 
made statements indicating it was positive).  
93 Statement by Ir. on the McCormack Report, CCW Thirteenth Meeting of the 
Group of Government 
Experts on ERW (Mar. 2006). 
94 See Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 109.  
95 Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 51; see also INT’L COMM. 
OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES 
OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICT 49 (2015). 
96 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 95, at 40–43; see also Michael N. 
Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello, 84 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 365, 392 (2002) (discussing examples of how military cyber-attacks on 
infrastructure often have residual second tier effects on the civilian population). 
97 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 108; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
URBAN SERVICES DURING PROTRACTED ARMED CONFLICT 21–27 (2015) (discuss-
ing the cumulative impact of armed conflict on essential services and civilian well-
being). 
98 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 109. 
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not “take place immediately.”99 The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) has determined that incidental damage also includes indirect 
incidental damage,100 also known as “knock-on effects” or “indirect ef-
fects.”101 Various military manuals include consequential incidental dam-
age within the rules of precaution and proportionality.102 Under the PoP and 
the principle of precaution, Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b) of 
API of GC include the “may be expected” phrase to avoid damages to civil-
ians in terms of incidental damages.103 This phrase is not limited by time or 
space, and the 1974–1977 Diplomatic Conference explicitly maintained that 
the scope of this phrase cannot be limited to immediate vicinities.104 This 
means that it includes reverberating effects. Likewise, Article 51 of API of 
GC must also be read in conformity with the principle of precaution to pro-
tect civilians from dangers of arising from military operations.105 Similarly, 
Articles 54(2) and 56(1) explicitly forbid targeting protected objects,106 
which are objects that are crucial for the sustenance of the civilian popula-
tion.107 As a result, some scholars argue that the phrase “may be expected” 
is not limited to the direct effects of an attack but includes the foreseeable 
long-term damages or third-tier damages.108 Similarly, scholars also believe 
that incidental damage includes the foreseeable damage of reverberating ef-
fects.109 
State practice also supports the idea that the reverberating effects of mili-
tary actions, especially the “explosive remnants of war” (ERW), must be 
incorporated in judging the legality of war and analyzing the PoP and the 
principle of precaution.110 In the Third Review Conference on the Conven-
tional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious to 
                                                
99 Id. at 128.  
100 Id. at 112–13 (citing Laurent Gisel, Relevant Incidental Harm for the Propor-
tionality Principle, 16 BRUGES COLLOQUIUM URB. WARFARE 125 (2015)). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 112; see DINSTEIN, supra note 84, at 150. 
103 See Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 
art 57(2)(b). 
104 See MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 
309–10 (1982). 
105 Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 51(1).  
106 Id. at art. 54(2), 56(1).  
107 MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 222 
(2014) (citing Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Attacks: Proportionality and Precautions 
in Attack, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 198, 206–07 (2013)) (posing the question of “whether 
incidental ‘damage’ on protected objects includes not only physical damage, but 
also loss of functionality.”). 
108 Cordula Droege, Get Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitari-
an Law and the Protection of Civilians, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 533, 573 (2012). 
109 See Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 114. 
110 Id. at 115. 
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Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) of 2006, a majority of states agreed that 
the reverberating effects of ERW must be incorporated.111 Switzerland 
maintained that “military commanders … must take into account … the 
foreseeable long-term effects of an attack such as the humanitarian costs 
caused by duds becoming ERW.”112 As a result, the CCW of 2006, adopted 
by consensus, noted that “the foreseeable effects of explosive remnants of 
war are [a] relevant factor to be considered in applying the international 
humanitarian rules on proportionality and precaution in attack.”113 Similar-
ly, in 2015, at the ICRC meeting on the effects of explosive weapons in 
populated areas, numerous states agreed that the military action must take 
into account the reverberating effects of an attack.114 Even the US Army 
Counterinsurgency Manual of 2006 states that “leaders must consider not 
only the first-order, desired effects of a munition or action but also possible 
second- and third-order-effects – including undesired ones.”115 Thus, hu-
manitarian laws and the PoP do include the reverberating effects of military 
actions, in addition to the direct damage caused to civilian objects.116 
2.  Foreseeability 
In addition to the ICRC, the declaration of the CCW,117 and the United 
States Army Manuals118 discussed above, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights of 1999 stated that the PoP implies that the foreseeable 
damages to civilians must not be in excess to the direct military objec-
tives.119 Scholars and the Commentary on Harvard Humanitarian Policy 
and Conflict Research Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and 
Missile Warfare (AMW Manual) found that foreseeable damage is damage 
that is “more likely than not.”120 Other scholars maintain that the word “ex-
                                                
111 THIRD REV. CONF. OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON 
PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL 
WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE 
INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS 4 (2006) [hereinafter THIRD REV. CONF.].  
112 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 115 (citing Response from Switz. to Doc-
ument CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/2P.2, CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/WP.13 § 15 (Aug. 3, 
2005)).  
113 THIRD REV. CONF., supra note 111. 
114 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS: 
HUMANITARIAN, LEGAL, TECHNICAL, AND MILITARY ASPECTS 23 (2015).  
115 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY 7-7 (2006).  
116 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 118. 
117 THIRD REV. CONF., supra note 111.  
118 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 115.  
119 INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THIRD REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
SITUATION IN COLOMBIA ch. IV ¶ 79 (Feb. 26, 1999), 
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Colom99en/table%20of%20contents.htm. 
120 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 118; see ROSCINI, supra note 107, at 221.  
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pected” only means “likely to occur.”121 They argue that even a forty per-
cent chance of likelihood is sufficient to conclude it is expected, although it 
is less likely than not.122 Moreover, they consider that the standard of fore-
seeability is a vital characteristic in calculating the reverberating effects of a 
military action with regard to the PoP.123 
3. Objective Test 
A few people and states are of the view that the foreseeability of inci-
dental harm in respect of military advantage under the PoP is based on the 
subjective test of the commanding officer.124 This means that the subjective 
knowledge of a commander will determine whether the damage was fore-
seeable to him or not.125 For instance the US Law of War Manual states that 
the question of determining an incidental harm “is subjective and impre-
cise.”126 However, the inclusion of the words “may be” and “expected” in 
the relevant provisions establish that the test of foreseeability under the PoP 
is not a subjective one but rather an objective one.127 The IRC Commentary 
on Article 57 supports the proposition that the test is objective by stating 
that “the interpretation must above all be a question of common sense and 
good faith for military commanders.”128 An objective test includes “com-
mon sense” and “good faith for military commanders.”129 One scholar also 
asserted that it is an objective test and that the attacker “must act reasonably 
and in good faith.”130 Similarly, other scholars agree that the attacker must 
be “reasonable” and must reasonably use the information.131 The Canadian 
Manual on the Law of Armed Conflicts also states that the criterion for ana-
lyzing the incidental damage is an “objective one: Did the commander, 
planner or staff officer do what a reasonable person would have done in the 
circumstances?”132  
                                                
121 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 118. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 119. 
124 Id.  
125 BOTHE ET AL., supra note 104, at 310.  
126 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 266 (2016). 
127 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 119. 
128 Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 57.  
129 Marco Sassòli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: 
Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, 90 INT’L 
L. STUD. 308, 335 (2014). 
130 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 120. 
131 FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WARS 115 (2011). 
132 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 120 (citing CAN., OFFICE OF THE JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GEN., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL 
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
held that the test is to analyze “whether a reasonable well-informed person 
in the circumstances of the actual perpetuator” would have acted according-
ly.133 The ICTY suggested that the test is an objective test of the “reasona-
ble military commander.”134 A “reasonable commander test” is a higher ob-
jective test for the foreseeability than the test of “a reasonable man” 
because, in a situation of a war, a reasonable man cannot be implied to pos-
sess as intricate a knowledge of the affairs of war as a knowledgeable 
commander.135 Some scholars therefore maintain that the test of a reasona-
ble commander is that of a subjective agent while testing him objective-
ly.136 Some states including Israel support the higher threshold of a reason-
able commander as an objective test for analyzing the incidental damage.137 
Therefore, the foreseeability of incidental harm can be considered to have 
the standard of a reasonable commander in calculating the reverberating ef-
fects of a military action, using the available information reasonably. This 
objective test of a reasonable commander in lieu of a subjective test elimi-
nates the negligent actions of a commander from the calculations of inci-
dental harm caused.138 
4. State Practices and Past Experiences 
It is noted that future practices are based on the lesson learned from past 
experiences to calculate the reverberating effects of incidental damage on 
civilian lives and property. For instance, the US Joint Services and the Col-
lateral Damage Estimation Methodologies rely heavily on empirical data 
and the past experiences of damage assessments to calculate the collateral 
damage from attacks.139 For example, NATO forces in Kosovo used graph-
                                                                                                             
LEVELS: JOINT DOCTRINE MANUAL § 418 (2001)). 
133 Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ¶ 58 (Dec. 5, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf. 
134 FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO 
REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
YUGOSLAVIA ¶ 50 (2008). 
135 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 121 (citing Marco Sassoli & Lindsey 
Cameron, The Law of Air Warfare: Contemporary Issues, in 1 ESSENTIAL AIR & 
SPACE L. 65 (Natalinio Ronzitti & Gabriella Venturini eds., 2006)) 
136 Enzo Cannizzaro, Proportionality in the Law of Armed Conflict, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 339 (Andrew Clapham 
& Paola Gaeta eds., 2014).  
137 STATE OF ISRAEL, THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT (7 JULY–26 AUGUST 2014) 181 
(2015). 
138 See Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 121. 
139 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NO-STRIKE AND THE COLLATERAL 
DAMAGE ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY, CJCSI 3160.01A D1 (2012). 
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ite filaments to temporarily disable the electricity system to avoid long-term 
permanent failure, bearing in mind the reverberating effects of electricity 
failures in the long-term.140 This is because the general public and numer-
ous states are presently well aware of the interconnected reverberating ef-
fects of incidental damage to infrastructure on civilians’ lives and proper-
ty.141 An ICRC report on the reverberating effects of explosives in 
populated areas under the PoP also noted that electricity failures diminish 
water supplies, obstructs evacuations, and compromises waste disposal sys-
tems.142 Similarly, UNICEF reported that failures of electricity and water 
supplies in Syria have reduced health and increased breakouts of a number 
of deadly diseases due to unhygienic conditions.143 In evaluating electricity 
failure due to armed attacks and its reverberating effects on the civilians, 
two scholars, Arkin and Crawford, noted that the electricity failure in Iraq 
in 1991 caused the deaths of 70,000 civilian people,144 because the electrici-
ty capacity reached a level that was fifteen percent of its pre-conflict capaci-
ty, which affected the health care system.145 Moreover, the reverberating 
effects of nuclear bombs on the children born in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
are common knowledge these days. Therefore, they cannot be treated as a 
remote, speculative, or unexpected damage.146 For these reasons, interna-
tional organizations and states are including the reverberating effects of mil-
itary actions in their reports and manuals. For instance, the ICRC explicitly 
mentioned that the PoP must include the reverberating effects of submuni-
tions, especially on the food, water, health care, and daily activities of civil-
ians.147 In support of acknowledging the reverberating effects of war on ci-
                                                
140 Dana Priest, France Played Skeptic on Kosovo Attacks, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 
1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/daily/sept99/airwar20.htm (noting some potential effects of electricity 
failures). 
141 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 123–24 (citing INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, URBAN SERVICES DURING PROTRACTED ARMED CONFLICT 28–32 (2015); 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND THE 
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICT 52 (2015); INT’L COMM. OF 
THE RED CROSS, EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS: HUMANITARIAN, 
LEGAL, TECHNICAL, AND MILITARY ASPECTS 23 (2015)).  
142 Id.  
143 Millions of Children in Syria at High Risk of Disease amid Water Scarcity and 
Summer Heat, UNICEF (July 10, 2015), 
https://www.unicef.org/media/media_82509.html. 
144 William Arkin, Tactical Bombing of Iraqi Forces Outstripped Value of Strategic 
Hits, Analyst Contends, AVIATION WK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 27, 1992, at 63. 
145 J.W. Crawford, III, The Law of Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of 
National Electrical Power Systems, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 101, 109–10 
(1997). 
146 Louis Maresca & Eleanor Mitchell, The Human Costs and Legal Consequences 
of Nuclear Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law, 97 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 621, 634 (2015). 
147 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 98 (citing CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/WP.7, Ge-
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vilians based on past experiences, the ICRC also noted that “past experi-
ences has put users on notice about the long-term dangers that cluster muni-
tions cause to civilians.”148 
In considering the past practices and experiences, the Nicaragua Case in 
the ICJ is a landmark case of common knowledge, with utmost relevance. 
In that case, the ICJ established that arming rebels in another state is not al-
lowed and is considered to be an act of war, aggression, and an armed at-
tack.149 Past experiences in Libya,150 Lebanon,151 Iraq,152 Afghanistan,153 
and Syria154 have established clearly that arming and training rebels yields 
catastrophic long-term reverberating effects under the PoP. For instance, 
first, the arms provided to rebels mostly end up in the hands of terrorists.155 
ISIS is primarily using weapons provided by coalition members that were 
originally meant to change the regime or fight terrorism.156 Second, the 
fight against terrorism is effective if the government of the host state is 
strong. But supporting rebels to change the regime and fight the state’s own 
government destabilizes the state and decreases the state’s capacity to fight 
terrorism effectively.157 It is now a known fact that arming rebels to fight a 
proxy war or to change the regime not only is illegal but also destabilizes 
                                                                                                             
neva ¶ 21 (Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Working Paper)). 
148 Louis Maresca, Cluster Munitions: Moving Towards Specific Regulation, 4 
UNIDIR DISARMAMENT F. 27, 29 (2006), 
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cluster-munitions-en-337.pdf. 
149 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 242, 247 (June 27); G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) 
(Dec. 14, 1974). 
150 See Seumas Milne, Coups and Terror are the Fruit of NATO’s War in Libya, 
GUARDIAN (May 22, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/22/coups-terror-nato-war-
in-libya-west-intervention-boko-haram-nigeria. 
151 See BILAL Y. SAAB, SABAN CTR. AT BROOKINGS, LEVANTINE RESET: TOWARD A 
MORE VIABLE U.S. STRATEGY FOR LEBANON 17 (2010), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/07_lebanon_saab.pdf. 
152 See Seumas Milne, Now the Truth Emerges: How the US Fuelled the Rise of Isis 
in Syria and Iraq, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/03/us-isis-syria-iraq.  
153 See Michel Chossudovsky, Al-Qaeda and the “War on Terror,” GLOBAL POL’Y 
F. (Jan. 20, 2008), 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26821.html. 
154 Mara Karlin, After 7 Years of War, Assad Has Won in Syria. What’s Next for 
Washington? BROOKINGS (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2018/02/13/after-7-years-of-war-assad-has-won-in-syria-whats-next-
for-washington/; Wire Staff, Assad: U.S. Trying to Destabilize Syria, CNN (July 8, 
2012), https://www.cnn.com/2012/07/08/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html. 
155 Mallory Shelbourne, Study Shows US Weapons Given to Syrian Rebels Ended 
Up in ISIS Hands, HILL (Dec. 14, 2017), https://thehill.com/policy/defense/364917-
study-shows-us-weapons-given-to-syrian-rebels-ended-up-in-isiss-hands. 
156 Id. 
157 See Karlin, supra note 154; Wire Staff, supra note 154. 
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the host state and the region, resulting in increased violence, increased ter-
rorism, and increased destruction.158 Since the international law of using 
force does not allow the arming of rebels,159 and because the reverberating 
effects of doing so include increases in terrorism, violence, destruction, and 
instability, it is only reasonably foreseeable that providing support to rebels 
in another country is disproportionate under the rules of international law of 
using force and the PoP and the principles of precaution.160 
In practice under PoP, Ireland has advised that military commanders 
must be informed of the long-term effects of conflicts on civilians,161 and 
Norway has expressed its opinion that past experiences in Laos and Vi-
etnam are sufficient to establish that munitions have long-term reverberat-
ing effects on civilians.162 The UK in its Joint Services Manual of the Law 
of Armed Conflict says that incidental damage needs to be considered in re-
lation to the anticipated military advantage.163 It also explicitly says that 
“injury … excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated … 
would be disproportionate and unlawful, owing to the excessive collateral 
damage.”164 Similarly, the United States (US), in its Counterinsurgency 
Manual, states that military action should avoid “the use of area munitions 
to minimize the potential harm inflicted on non-combatants located near-
by.”165 
In sum, the reverberating effects of an attack are reasonably foreseeable 
in populated areas under the PoP and the principle of precaution.166 Like-
wise, long-term effects of economic sanctions and denial of access owing to 
the inability to repair essential services in the basic infrastructure are also 
reasonably known.167 Therefore, it is only reasonably foreseeable that there 
                                                
158 See Chossudovsky, supra note 153; Karlin, supra note 154; Milne, supra note 
152; Wire Staff, supra note 154. 
159 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 242, 292(3) (June 27).  
160 See id. 
161 Delegate of Ir., United Nations Office at Geneva: Explosive Remnants of War 
Intervention, Address Before the Main Committee II at the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons Review Conference at the Palais des Nations (Nov. 9, 
2006). 
162 SIMON CONWAY, CLUSTER MUNITIONS: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF USE AND 
HUMAN IMPACTS (2007). 
163 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 5.32.4, at 82–83 (2004) (U.K.).  
164 Id. at 86. 
165 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 115.  
166 KATHLEEN LAWAND ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, A GUIDE TO THE 
LEGAL REVIEW OF NEW WEAPONS, MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE 15, 18 
(2006). 
167 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 125. 
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will be a stronger reverberating effect on civilian lives in the states of Syria, 
Yemen, and Libya due to the sanctions and destruction of the infrastruc-
ture.168 
5.  Precaution 
The duty of precaution obliges the military to verify that the target serves 
as a valid military objective169 and to assess the expected incidental dam-
age170 to avoid all unnecessary incidental damage.171 Not taking precau-
tions, or not cancelling the mission upon knowing172 that it does not serve a 
military objective, may violate the PoP.173 
The ICRC commentary on Article 57 of API of GC says that the rule of 
precaution is indispensable in highly populated areas owing to a dense civil-
ian presence.174 The previous subsections discussed the obligation of mili-
tary commanders to consider reasonable and foreseeable reverberating ef-
fects of an attack with regard to incidental damage under the PoP. This 
subsection will explain how in the practical sense of taking precautions a 
commander must act reasonably to execute this obligation. Precautions can 
be defined as considering and avoiding actions that “are practicable or prac-
tically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, in-
cluding humanitarian and military considerations.”175 These considerations 
include the objective test of a reasonable commander with the considera-
tions of foreseeable and reasonably available information at that time and 
place.176 The rule of precaution obliges the commander to take all reasona-
ble steps to avoid disproportionate incidental harm by the actions and pro-
hibits the commander from taking any action that is reasonably dispropor-
tionate.177 Some scholars say that these actions and precautions are based 
                                                
168 Id. 
169 Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 48 art. 51; HENCKAERTS & 
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 82, at 55. 
170 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 111–12. 
171 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 82, at 55. 
172 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT RULES FOR THE LIMITATION OF THE 
DANGERS INCURRED BY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN TIME OF WAR art. 8 (1956), 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/420?OpenDocument. 
173 Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 57; HENCKAERTS & 
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 82, at 60, 62. 
174 CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 679 (Yves Sandoz 
et al. eds., 1987). 
175 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 134. 
176 See Michael N. Schmitt & Eric W. Widmar, “On Target”: Precision and bal-
ance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 379, 
401 (2014). 
177 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 82, at 58. 
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on the information actually available,178 while others believe that these ob-
ligations are based on the information reasonably available.179 This differ-
entiation is that of a subjective or objective test; which as discussed above, 
it was established that proportionality is to be judged objectively rather than 
subjectively. 
As a slightly higher objective standard than that of a reasonable com-
mander, many states oblige their commanders to obtain the “best possible 
intelligence”180 to determine the incidental harm of an attack. For instance, 
Australia obliges its commanders to obtain the “best possible intelligence” 
of densely populated areas and town structures with regard to military ob-
jectives and their incidental harm.181 In this context, the best information 
will include: a complete understanding of the essential infrastructure, sec-
ondary and tertiary infrastructure, and their interconnectedness with other 
services.182 One scholar, William Boothby, argues that the precaution must 
also include technical expertise in understanding the intricate relationship 
between infrastructure, services, and their effects to calculate incidental 
harm.183 In fact, some states already require experts to analyze the inci-
dental harm of certain weaponry.184 For instance, US war manuals involve 
civil engineers to calculate the incidental damage to water supplies, power 
grids, and sewage networks from an attack.185 The US guidelines also con-
sider in depth the reverberating effects of incidental harm and try to protect 
and minimize the damage against infrastructure and essential facilities.186 In 
fact, the US explicitly refers to and prohibits “incidental damage” in excess 
of the military objectives and military advantage achieved.187 It also man-
dates the attack be in harmony with the IHL principles of necessity, propor-
tionality, and distinction.188 Moreover, it requires commanders to warn ci-
                                                
178 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 135. 
179 Id. 
180 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 82.  
181 Law of Armed Conflict 2006 (Cth) ss 5.53, 5.54 (Austl.). 
182 Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 136. 
183 See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 414 (2012). 
184 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 114, at 36. 
185 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO URBAN 
OPERATIONS 3-2 (2008). 
186 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-06, JOINT 
URBAN OPERATIONS I-8 (2013) [hereinafter JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS]. 
187 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27–10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 
5 (1976); see Jason D. Wright, Excessive Ambiguity: Analysing and Refining the 
Proportionality Standard, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 819, 830 (2012). 
188 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60, JOINT 
TARGETING A-1 (2007) [hereinafter JOINT TARGETING]. 
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vilians to depart the area, if possible,189 or even cancel the attack if the tar-
get serves no military objective.190 
Within this structure, the US considers the destruction of infrastructure 
that increases civilian hardship.191 The US also gives special consideration 
to the environmental, chemical, biological, and radiological damage as-
sessment of an attack,192 with regard to the incidental harm under the pre-
caution heading, including the secondary and tertiary effects of an attack.193 
Similarly, Australia also gives special consideration to the secondary and 
tertiary incidental reverberating effects of an attack.194 Norway and Israel 
oblige their commanders to minimize the destruction of essential infrastruc-
ture.195 Jeff McMahan gives a very good example of analyzing the reasona-
ble foreseeability of an attack in a densely populated area.196 He says that 
the attacker must see the innocent civilians in the targeted area as the citi-
zens of the attacker’s own country; that way, they would know how many 
people they should be willing to harm in the attack.197 Therefore, the prin-
ciple of precaution under proportionality is infringed where a commander 
chooses to ignore the reasonably available information about the considera-
tions of the reverberating effects of an attack, irrespective of the planned or 
unplanned operational context.198 
In sum, commanders are obliged to take all foreseeable precautions to try 
to minimize civilian damage and the reverberating incidental harm of an at-
tack.199 Through modernization in technology, there are several ways to re-
                                                
189 Id. at A-5; Wright, supra note 187, at 831. 
190 JOINT TARGETING, supra note 188, at A-5; Wright, supra note 187, at 31. 
191 JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS, supra note 186, at III-9. 
192 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NO-STRIKE AND COLLATERAL 
DAMAGE ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY Appendix A, Enclosure A (1976) [hereinaf-
ter NO-STRIKE AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY]. 
193 See id. at Appendix A, Enclosure D. 
194 AUSTL. DEP’T OF DEFENCE, OPERATIONS SERIES, ADDP 3.14, TARGETING § 1.21 
(2009). 
195 See Operational Response, ISRAELI DEF. FORCE, 
https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/questions-and-answers-concerning-the-violent-riots-
and-attacks-occurring-on-the-border-between-gaza-and-israel-during-2018-9/gaza-
border-events-qa/operational-response/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2018) (explaining the 
general principles of distinction and proportionality in Israeli Defense Force opera-
tions); The Values and Standards of the Norwegian Armed Forces: Human Dignity, 
NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES (July 29, 2015), 
https://forsvaret.no/en/ForsvaretDocuments/ValuesAndStandards.pdf (laying out a 
responsibility to distinguish civilians and civilian objects and avoid unnecessary 
collateral damage). 
196 See McMahan, supra note 32, at 14–15. 
197 See id. 
198 BOOTHBY & HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note 86, at 136.  
199 See Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 176, at 402; see also HENCKAERTS & 
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 82, at 56. 
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duce incidental harm.200 For instance, “precision-based guided missile sys-
tems” and “physics-based computer modeling” can effectively decrease the 
incidental reverberating effects of an attack.201 Some scholars support the 
argument that guided missiles can reduce incidental damage,202 and others 
suggest that filament bombs can do so too.203 The rule of precaution also 
obliges attackers to not target densely populated areas, and allows certain 
areas to have restricted attacks, if possible.204 In compliance, the US also 
allows the creation of no-fire zones205 and prohibits targets located in 
densely populated areas to protect civilians.206 In addition, the US also 
mandates its commanders to abort an attack if the accuracy of the target is 
not certain.207 Similarly, Israel prohibits the use of artillery in urban popu-
lated areas in addition to its IHL requirements, but exceptionally allows the 
same only to pursue the necessary military objectives.208 
6. Drones 
Drones strikes are target killing, which are only legitimate if taken with 
the consent of the host state because, without consent, drone strikes violate 
the sovereignty of a host state.209 Moreover, the conduct of drone strikes 
must fulfill all the IHL principles, including proportionality, distinction, and 
necessity.210 Drones are disproportionate, because on average a drone strike 
kills about ten innocent people as collateral damage.211 Likewise, Joshua 
Andersen established that drones actually put more civilian lives at risk, 
disproportionately, and the assumption that precise-targeting drones de-
crease possible civilian casualties is based on false premises.212 For this, he 
                                                
200 Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. J. 143, 168 (1999). 
201 See NO-STRIKE AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY, supra 
note 192; Gisel, supra note 87, at 128. 
202 DINSTEIN, supra note 84, at 142. 
203 See Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 176, at 402. 
204 Jean-François Quéguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of 
Hostilities, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793, 800 (2006). 
205 JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS, supra note 186, at IV-18. 
206 Id. at IV-16. 
207 Id. 
208 See STATE OF ISRAEL, supra note 137, at 192. 
209 See Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks Under the Just ad Bellum and Jus in 
Bello: Clearing the “Fog of Law”, 13 YEARBOOK INT’L HUM. L. 311, 315 (2010). 
210 DRONE WARS: TRANSFORMING CONFLICT, LAW, AND POLICY 151 (Peter L. Ber-
gen & Daniel Rothenberg eds., 2014). 
211 NETA C. CRAWFORD, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLING: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE IN AMERICA’S POST-9/11 WARS 209 (2013). 
212 See Joshua Andresen, Putting Lethal Force on the Table: How Drones Change 
the Alternative Space of War and Counterterrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 
426, 427, 431 (2017). 
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compared the results of civilian casualties resulting from strikes from 
manned aircrafts in the known disproportionate NATO war in Kosovo213 
with the deaths resulting from drone strikes.214 Even if the combatants are 
present in urban areas with the civilians, the Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) guidelines protect civilians from any attack,215 unless it is abso-
lutely necessary,216 proportional, and justifiable under the theory of collat-
eral damage. The rules of proportionality and distinction are actually meant 
for hostile battlefields, not for civilians’ residences.217 Therefore, these 
rules must be reformulated to include the need to use airstrikes in civilian 
areas, away from hostilities, by keeping in view the long-term reverberating 
effects, such as increases in violence and terrorist recruitment in relation-
ship with drone airstrikes.218 However, other scholars warn about altering 
universally accepted rules owing to the possible pitfalls of doing so.219 An-
dersen believes in alteration only because the US policy for identifying the 
“immediate threat” is wider than the established conditions,220 such as that 
US drone strikes almost never include as targets immediate threats away 
from active hostilities, which presumably never require immediate respons-
es or the use of lethal force.221 Other states are also following the example 
of using airstrikes in populated areas, away from hostilities.222 Therefore, 
the use of airstrikes in civilian populated areas must be restricted to abso-
                                                
213 Id. at 431. 
214 Id. 
215 Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ¶ 58 (Dec. 5, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf; see also Geneva Con-
ventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 50, art. 51. 
216 HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. State of Isr. 53(4) PD 817 
(1999) (Isr.) (translation available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/94/000/051/A09//94051000.A09.htm). 
217 See Andresen, supra note 212, at 432. 
218 See CHRISTOPHER D. KOLENDA ET AL., OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., THE STRATEGIC 
COSTS OF CIVILIAN HARM: APPLYING LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN TO CURRENT 
AND FUTURE CONFLICTS 23–25 (2016); JASON LYALL, BOMBING TO LOSE? 
AIRPOWER, CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, AND THE DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE IN 
COUNTERINSURGENCY WARS 4 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2422170. 
219 See Jeremy Waldron, Can Targeted Killing Work as a Neutral Principle? 1 
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 11-20, 2011). 
220 See Andresen, supra note 212, at 449. 
221 Id. at 451; see also Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A 
Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 
UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1219 (2013). 
222 See W.J. Hennigan, A Fast Growing Club: Countries That Use Drones for Kill-
ing by Remote Control, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016), 
https://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-drone-proliferation-2-20160222-
story.html. 
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lutely necessary cases,223 but its overuse by misuse must be curtailed.224 
Andersen argues that, since the drone strikes are counterproductive in de-
creasing terrorism and increasing US security,225 their cessation would be 
efficient in the execution of military objectives of US security.226 
D.  Excessive Damage: Weighing Military Advantage against Harm Caused 
There is no formula for weighing incidental harm against military objec-
tives, but we can generally formulate the premises of calculating propor-
tionality. To calculate this, one can list all the harm done by a war and 
compare those with the military objectives achieved. If the harm done is in 
excess of what was achieved by the war, or if the war is producing ineffec-
tive or counterproductive results,227 then such a war can be considered dis-
proportionate. In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ established that the PoP can-
not be justified in self-defense if the attack of aggression or the threat of an 
attack has ceased to exist.228 Similarly, in the Oil Platform Case the ICJ al-
so established that the principles of proportionality and necessity are inter-
linked because a war or an attack cannot be proportional if it was unneces-
sary.229 The proportionality requires the use of defensive force to repel an 
attack.230 Proportionality weighs in the force used by both sides.231 In pro-
portionality, the legitimate aim cannot be the complete annihilation of the 
enemy; rather, it must be weighed against the threat from the other side.232 
However, in its advisory opinion on nuclear weapons the ICJ maintained 
that the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in self-defense is le-
gitimate, despite its disproportionate devastative characteristics,233 though 
only if the existence of a nation is under threat.234 This view of the ICJ is 
                                                
223 See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. State of Isr. 53(4) PD 
817 (1999) (Isr.) (translation available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/94/000/051/A09//94051000.A09.htm). 
224 See Itamar Mann & Omer Shatz, The Necessity Procedure: Laws of Torture in 
Israel and Beyond, 1987-2009, 6 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 59, 63 (2010). 
225 THRALL & GOEPNER, supra note 6, at 1. 
226 Andresen, supra note 212, at 471.  
227 THRALL & GOEPNER, supra note 6, at 2.  
228 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 237 (June 27).  
229 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Judgement, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 
161, ¶ 77 (Nov. 6). 
230 GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 46, at 80–81. 
231 See D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (1958). 
232 See TARCISIO GAZZINI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (2005). 
233 YORUM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION & SELF-DEFENCE 210 (2001). 
234 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 89 (July 8). 
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justified under the principle of necessity – that as a last resort, to defend a 
nation, a state can take all necessary measures. Moreover, it is interesting to 
note that military actions are proportional so long as they are defensive in 
nature.235 The moment they become aggressive in nature and stop being de-
fensive, they become disproportionate.236 
For determining the excessiveness under the proportionality, the ICTY in 
the case of Prosecutor v. Galic (2003) used the objective test for a military 
general had violated the PoP because the attacks resulted in the deaths of 
thousands of civilians.237 The court also weighed in the mens rea require-
ment of war crimes under Article 83 of API of GC to conclude that the 
commander had knowledge that the attack would cause excessive civilian 
casualties.238 Similarly, to determine the excessive damage in terms of inci-
dental civilian deaths and injuries,239 the Israeli Supreme Court decided that 
this must be decided on a case-by-case basis240 by the objective test of a 
reasonable commander.241 The Israeli Supreme Court also established that a 
missile attack on a building, resulting in several civilian deaths, to eliminate 
one combatant is bound to be considered a disproportionate act.242 The con-
curring opinion agreed that severe collateral damage cannot be justified, 
even against substantial military benefits, under the PoP.243 The Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court, in furtherance to API of GC, pro-
vides an innovative mechanism to judge excessive damage. It says that the 
knowledge of clear excessive damage in collateral damage in relation with 
the “overall military advantage” is sufficient to prove disproportionality.244 
It is interesting to note that the term “overall” instead of “direct” raises the 
threshold of excessiveness.245 However, it is very useful and intriguing to 
analyze the overall excess of damage in relation to the overall military ob-
                                                
235 See H. VICTOR CONDÉ, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TERMINOLOGY 208–09 (2004). 
236 See id. 
237 See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 58 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
238 Id. at ¶ 59; Wright, supra note 187, at 842 (citing Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. 
IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003)). 
239 See Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, at ¶¶ 58, 59. 
240 HCJ 796/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. State of Isr. 53(4) PD ¶ 46 
(2005) (Isr.). 
241 Id. at ¶ 57. 
242 Id. at ¶ 46.  
243 Id. ¶ 5. 
244 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an In-
ternational Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 
8(a)(b)(iv), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/13 (Vol. 1) (1998). 
245 Wright, supra note 187, at 843. 
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jective achieved. It gives some perspective on the efficacy of a war, and the 
results achieved within it, to calculate the overall proportionality of a war. 
For instance, if the war had been started for the cause of eliminating ter-
rorism, and instead it is increasing terrorism, destabilization, and violence, 
costing trillions of dollars in damage and causing millions of deaths, then 
such a war can be easily considered disproportional – since the military ob-
jectives are not met, the war is counterproductive246 to its objectives, the 
loss on one side is far greater than the perceived future threats, and the harm 
caused was reasonably foreseeable. However, if the damage caused by mili-
tary action is in direct relation to the military objectives, then the actions 
can be considered proportional.247 For instance, if the military objective is 
to thwart aggression, direct force used against legitimate targets is propor-
tional.248 Moreover, in accordance with traditional theory, if the harm of a 
war outweighs its relevant good, then such a war is not only disproportion-
ate but also an unjust war because of its disproportionality.249 Similarly, if a 
war is unjust, then no relevant good can be achieved, therefore an unjust 
war will always be a disproportionate war.250 For these reasons, Part II will 
list the damage caused by some prominent wars of this century and com-
pare them with the military objectives for which they were commenced, to 
analyze the overall proportionality of the military action. 
II.  THE WAR ON TERROR [WOT] (2001–PRESENT) 
The WoT pursues an unidentifiable enemy, general terrorism, which 
cannot be put to an end by military means.251 The WoT has been recog-
nized as having counterproductively increasing violence in the Middle East 
and insecurity against the West, rather than increasing the security of the 
world or decreasing terrorism.252 The world has seen a perpetual state of 
war since 2001. After seventeen years of the WoT, there is still no hope for 
its end. On its commencement, then-US-president George W. Bush admit-
ted that the WoT “will not end until every terrorist group of global reach 
                                                
246 Ahmed, supra note 4; Milne, supra note 150; THRALL & GOEPNER, supra note 
6, at 1–2. 
247 See Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 51. 
248 See GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 46, at 80. 
249 McMahan, supra note 32, at 10. 
250 Id. at 13. 
251 Todd Richissin, “War on Terror” Difficult to Define, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 2, 
2004). 
252 THRALL & GOEPNER, supra note 6, at 13–14; Williams, supra note 7.  
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has been found, stopped and defeated.”253 He also admitted that the WoT is 
“a task that does not end.”254 
Regarding the increase in terrorism after and during the WoT, Robert 
Pape has noted that US military occupations have increased terrorism rather 
than decreased it.255 A similar conclusion was drawn in 2006 by the Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate, comprising sixteen intelligence agencies.256 
Moreover, scholar Cornelia Beyer noted that terrorism has increased be-
cause of the economic policies of the West.257 Shirley Williams, a British 
politician, warned that the US and UK are “sowing … the seedbed of the 
future terrorism.”258 Ivor Roberts, a British Ambassador to Italy, dead-
panned that Bush was “the best recruiting sergeant ever for Al Qaeda.”259 
More controversially, it has also been noted that the US has granted the 
Mojahedin-e Khalq (a terrorist organization according to the US Depart-
ment of State) the status of “protected persons” under the GC.260 The US 
also provided safe havens to a designated terrorist, Louis Posada Car-
riles.261 A three-star US general and a former National Security Agency di-
rector has also pointed out that “the US has a long record of supporting ter-
rorists and using terrorist tactic.”262  
Support for rebel groups is also noted as one of the largest factors in in-
creasing terrorism and violence.263 Rebel groups are often trained and 
armed by the coalition partners in the WoT.264 Usually, most of the US aid-
ed weapons to these groups end up in the hands of terrorists.265 The rebel 
                                                
253 George W. Bush, President, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People (Sept. 20, 2001). 
254 Id. 
255 See ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE 
TERRORISM 103 (2006). 
256 Mark Mazzetti, Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/world/middleeast/24terror.html. 
257 See CORNELIA BEYER, VIOLENT GLOBALISM 80 (2008). 
258 Williams, supra note 7.  
259 GLENN WESLEY PERUSEK, SHIFTING TERRAIN: ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY 
AND SOCIETY 8 (2006). 
260 Marc Warren, Belligerent Occupation, in U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS: LAW, 
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 676 (2015). 
261 Peter Kornbluh, A Safe Harbor for Luis Posada Carriles, NACLA (Sept. 25, 
2007), https://nacla.org/article/safe-harbor-luis-posada-carriles. 
262 Anthony Richards, The Importance of an Agreed Definition of Terrorism, in 
CONCEPTUALIZING TERRORISM 25 (2015) (citing William Odom, American He-
gemony: How to Use It, How to Lose It (Middlebury Coll., Rohatyn Ctr. for Int’l 
Affairs, Working Paper Series No. 24, 2006)).  
263 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 115, at B-15. 
264 See Shelbourne, supra note 155.  
265 Id.  
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groups are often divided or designated as terrorist groups.266 More specifi-
cally, the rebels fight their states, which destabilizes the governments and 
injures law enforcement officials and the infrastructure of a country.267 This 
contributes to an increase of violence and turns regions into breeding 
grounds for terrorism.268 Likewise, the regime change agenda is also seen 
as one of the greatest factors in increasing terrorism.269 The intervening 
hands remove authoritative political regimes to serve their political inter-
ests, and a political vacuum is created in the region, which is then filled by 
rebels, terrorists, and other organizations.270 The subsequent vacuum in the 
governing state gives wide room for the breeding of terrorism.271 This was 
the case with the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq,272 as well as with the 
removal of Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya.273 Without learning any lessons, 
the same goals – regime change and supporting rebels – are being pursued 
in Syria.274 As a result, Syrian territory has been destabilized and terrorism 
is on the rise.275 In conclusion, a former head of MI5 has labeled the WoT 
as a massive “overreaction” and maintained that this war is an erroneous 
tactic to fight terrorism.276 
The WoT has caused complete devastation and destabilization in several 
countries, including Afghanistan,277 Iraq,278 Syria,279 and Libya,280 where 
                                                
266 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 115, at 1-2. 
267 See Will Todman, Syria is Forcing Former Rebels to Fight Their Friends, DEF. 
ONE (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/09/syria-forcing-
former-rebels-fight-their-friends/151039/.  
268 Williams, supra note 7.  
269 See Wire Staff, supra note 154. 
270 See ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, TERRORISM: U.S. STRATEGY AND THE TRENDS IN 
ITS “WARS” ON TERRORISM 2, 5 (2018). 
271 Milne, supra note 152. 
272 Ewen MacAskill & Oliver Burkeman, Power Vacuum That Has Taken US by 
Surprise, GUARDIAN (April 11, 2003), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/11/usa.iraq. 
273 Milne, supra note 150.  
274 Wire Staff, supra note 154.  
275 Why Is There a War in Syria?, BBC (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229 (noting the Islamic State 
and al-Qaeda are allowed to flourish in Syria because of the existing conflict); see 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad: Facing Down Rebellion, BBC (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/10338256 (commenting that Syria is overrun by Islam-
ic State militants). 
276 Richard Norton-Taylor, Response to 9/11 was ‘Huge Overreaction”-ex-MI5 
Chief, GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2008), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/oct/18/stella-rimington-9-11-mi5. 
277 See Chossudovsky, supra note 153 (noting that the country has been through 25 
years of civil war); Simon Tisdall, The US Has Ruined Afghanistan. It Can’t Just 
Walk Away Now, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/08/us-afghanistan-civil-
war-fundamentalist (commenting that American departure from Afghanistan would 
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the governmental machinery is made incapable of fighting terrorism.281 The 
civilian infrastructure including electric grids and basic services like roads 
and markets is in complete ruins.282 The WoT has caused the death of sev-
eral million civilians.283 It has cost more than 4.4 trillion dollars in its pur-
suit, until 2015 alone.284 Yet, the results have been ineffective. The WoT 
has increased violence and terrorism and decreased world security – the 
complete opposite of its intentions. Presently, ISIS has about 30,000 fight-
ers in Iraq and Syria.285 In fact, the deaths due to terrorism, when compared 
to the start of WoT, have increased by 4500%.286 Suicide attacks in Iraq 
rose from zero in 2003 to 1,892 in 2015.287 In Pakistan, they rose from one 
in 2001 to 486 in 2015.288 The story is similar for Nigeria, Syria, Yemen, 
Libya, and Somalia.289 
A. Afghanistan War (2001–Present) 
According to Professor Marjorie Cohn, the United Nations (UN) Charter 
only allows the use of force in self-defense or with UNSC authorization.290 
But neither requisites was met in Afghanistan. The Taliban had not invaded 
the US – Al Qaeda did – and the UNSC did not authorize the US inva-
                                                                                                             
lead to “[a] rapid descent into civil war, involving government forces, jihadist 
groups and rival warlords, in a rerun of not-forgotten 1990s anarchy, is a strong 
possibility. Last year saw record civilian deaths, caused by terror bombings, inten-
sified fighting and increased US airstrikes.”). 
278 Michael Knights, Infrastructure Targeting and Postwar Iraq, WASH. INST. FOR 
NEAR E. POLICY (Mar. 14, 2003), 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/infrastructure-targeting-
and-postwar-iraq; Milne, supra note 152. 
279 Karlin, supra note 154. 
280 Milne, supra note 150. 
281 Id.; The Current Situation in Iraq, U.S. INST. PEACE (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/09/current-situation-iraq; see Tisdall, supra 
note 277. 
282 CATHERINE LUTZ, RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: THE LAST YEAR AND THE LAST 
DECADE 1 (2013); Knights, supra note 278. 
283 Ahmed, supra note 4. 
284 Hasan, supra note 3. 
285 Bethan McKernan, Up to 30,000 Isis Fighters Remain in Iraq and Syria, Says 
UN, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-fighters-iraq-syria-un-
report-jihadis-raqqa-iraq-a8492736.html. 
286 Hasan, supra note 3. 
287 Id.  
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Marjorie Cohn, Bombing of Afghanistan is Illegal and Must Be Stopped, 
MARJORIECOHN.COM (Nov. 6, 2001), https://marjoriecohn.com/bombing-of-
afghanistan-is-illegal-and-must-be-stopped/. 
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sion.291 Therefore, some argue that the Afghan war was illegal.292 The law 
of war does not allow the use of force in self-defense against non-state ac-
tors293 but it does acknowledge that non-state actors can carry out armed 
attacks.294 But this attack must be of the gravest nature to result in a valid 
claim of self-defense.295 Therefore, few other scholars and states agree that 
the US had a right to self-defense in response to the 9/11 attacks,296 when in 
2001 the US authorized its war against the people responsible.297 The US 
fought Al Qaeda for being responsible for 9/11 attacks and the Taliban for 
harboring Al Qaeda.298 Apart from fighting terrorists, the US supported the 
Tajiks and Uzbeks in the Afghan civil war, which destabilized the coun-
try.299 Scholars accuse the US of fostering the Taliban and Osama bin Lad-
en, before the invasion, for its political interests under Operation Cy-
clone.300 The UNSC and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) even 
called for a stop to these interferences in the sovereign grounds of Afghani-
stan.301 As of 2009, Al Qaeda forces were diminished to the meager number 
of one hundred members.302 However, as of 2019, US forces have not yet 
pulled out from the war, and there is no end in sight to this fight.303 
1. Damage 
According to the UN, opium production dramatically increased after the 
US invasion.304 The Afghan war is costing about 100 million dollars per 
                                                
291 Id. 
292 PAUL STREET, THE EMPIRE’S NEW CLOTHES: BARACK OBAMA IN THE REAL 
WORLD OF POWER 64 (2015). 
293 See Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force Against Non-State Actors: The State of 
Play, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 2 (2015). 
294 See Eric A. Heinze, Nonstate Actors in the International Legal Order: The Is-
raeli-Hezbollah Conflict and the Law of Self-Defense, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
87, 92 (2009). 
295 Hakimi, supra note 293, at 16. 
296 See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 206 (2018). 
297 Authorization to Use Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
298 See id. 
299 See NEYIRE AKPINARLI, THE FRAGILITY OF THE ‘FAILED STATE’ PARADIGM 56 
(2010).  
300 See, e.g., id. at 53. 
301 See id.  
302 Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, The Almanac of Al Qaeda, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Apr. 26, 2010), https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/26/the-almanac-of-al-
qaeda-2/. 
303 See Torfeh, supra note 1.  
304 See Vanda Felbab-Brown, Afghanistan’s Opium Production is Through the 
Roof-Why Washington Shouldn’t Overreact, BROOKINGS (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/11/21/afghanistans-opium-
production-is-through-the-roof-why-washington-shouldnt-overreact/. 
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day305 and it has incurred a cost of more than a trillion dollars;306 6,800 US 
soldiers have been killed in this war307 and more than 30,000 innocent civil-
ian lives have been lost, with more than 210,000 total casualties.308 Millions 
of more people are displaced309 and 1.17 million reports of war crimes in 
Afghanistan have been submitted to the ICJ.310 The infrastructure of Af-
ghanistan, including the electric grid, roads, hospitals, schools, and other 
essential services, have been dysfunctional since the war began.311 Violence 
and terrorism in the country are on the rise312 and the economy has been 
devastated.313 
2. Application 
To apply the PoP to the Afghanistan War, I will retrospectively analyze 
the overall military objective achieved against the overall harm caused, 
while evaluating its reasonableness and foreseeability. As discussed above, 
the reverberating effects of using explosives in civilian areas are foreseea-
ble.314 Similarly, the effects of supporting rebels in a state are also known: 
                                                
305 SIMON REICH & PETER DOMBROSWKI, THE END OF GRAND STRATEGY: US 
MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 36 (2017). 
306 Economic Costs, WATSON INST. FOR INT’L & PUB. AFF., 
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/economic (last visited Feb. 10, 2019). 
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https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/military (last visited Feb. 10, 
2019).  
308 Civilians Killed & Wounded, WATSON INST. FOR INT’L & PUB. AFF., 
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/military (last visited Feb. 10, 
2019).  
309 Afghanistan, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 
http://www.unhcr.org/afghanistan.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (noting that 
“there are almost 2.5 million registered refugees from Afghanistan”); General Se-
curity Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, EUROPEAN COUNTRY ORIGIN 
INFO. NETWORK (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/afghanistan/featured-topics/general-security-
situation-in-afghanistan-and-events-in-kabul (stating that roughly 2.7 million Af-
ghani refugees still remain outside the country). 
310 Kathy Gannon, Afghans Submit 1.17 Million War Crimes Claims to Internation-
al Court, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 17, 2018), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/afghanistan-war-crimes-
claims-victims-millions-submitted-court-isis-taliban-a8214301.html. 
311 See General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, supra note 
309. 
312 Why Afghanistan Is More Dangerous Than Ever, BBC (Sept. 14, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45507560. 
313 See General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, supra note 
309. 
314 See Robinson & Nohle, supra note 79, at 108 (citing Michael N. Schmitt, Wired 
Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
365, 392 (2002)). 
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armed support to rebels is tantamount to terrorism/armed attack itself.315 It 
increases violence and terrorism while destabilizing the country.316 This 
war had the military objectives of dealing with the people responsible for 
the 9/11 events and of decreasing terrorism.317 Any harm that does not di-
rectly benefit this goal is outside the military objective and is disproportion-
ate.318 In the Afghanistan War, the efforts to change the regime to justify 
military funding,319 support to rebels,320 support to drug/war lords,321 and 
seventeen years of military occupation322 are additional to the direct mili-
tary objective of dealing with the people responsible for the events of 9/11 
because, if the results of a war are such that the harm caused by it is more 
than the military objective achieved, then such a war is disproportionate.323 
While the US claims that Al Qaeda has been decimated,324 it acknowledges 
that this war is inefficient and counterproductive and it has given rise to ter-
rorism,325 violence,326 and drugs,327 rather than decreasing those. The coun-
ter-productivity of this war has instead decreased US security owing to the 
                                                
315 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 242 (June 27); see, e.g., Shelbourn, supra 
note 155 (explaining a study that shows US weapons ended up in the hands of ISIS 
fighters). 
316 See President Assad Accuses US of ‘Destabilizing’ Syria, BBC (July 9, 2012), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18763672; Karlin, supra note 154. 
317 Authorization to Use Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
318 See Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 51(5)(b). 
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(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2017/11/20/542871/US-invaded-
Afghanistan-largely-to-restore-heroine-industry; Johnny Dwyer, The U.S. Quietly 
Released Afghanistan’s Biggest Drug Kingpin from Prison. Did He Cut a Deal?, 
INTERCEPT (May 1, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/05/01/haji-juma-khan-
afghanistan-drug-trafficking-cia-dea. 
322 Matthew Fay, The War in Afghanistan is 17, NISKANEN CTR. BLOG (Oct. 11, 
2018), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/the-war-in-afghanistan-turns-17/.  
323 See Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 21, at art. 51; Practice Relating 
to Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule14 (last visited Feb. 10, 
2019).  
324 Susan Crabtree, WH Insists al Qaeda Core is ‘Decimated’, WASH. EXAMINER 
(Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/wh-insists-al-qaeda-core-
is-decimated. 
325 THRALL & GOEPNER, supra note 6, at 2 (citing BRAD STEPLETON, THE PROBLEM 
WITH THE LIGHT FOOTPRINT: SHIFTING TACTICS IN LIEU OF STRATGEY 11 (2016)).  
326 Why Afghanistan Is More Dangerous Than Ever, supra note 312.   
327 Jeffrey James Higgins, After 16 Years of War, Afghanistan Still World’s Heroin 
Supplier, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/after-16-years-of-war-
afghanistan-still-worlds-heroin-supplier. 
33
Qureshi: Applying the Principle of Proportionality to the War on Terror
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2019
Do Not Delete 4/30/19  7:06 PM 
412 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII:iii 
increase in terrorism.328 The Taliban still governs forty percent of the land, 
and warlords are occupying key high positions in Afghanistan.329 Al Qaeda 
has spread to Iraq, Algeria, and Syria from Afghanistan.330 Contrary to its 
goals, the US is ready to talk to the Taliban for a settlement, and the Taliban 
claims that the talks have already begun.331 Therefore, it can be rightly con-
cluded that the Afghan war was counterproductive,332 and it caused less 
good than harm. In reality, the war has caused a tremendous amount of 
damage to Afghanistan,333 cost billions of dollars to the US,334 killed mil-
lions of innocent civilians, destabilized the region, destroyed a country, de-
stroyed its infrastructure and basic essential service systems,335 and con-
sumed seventeen years of time.336 In sum, it can be concluded that, since 
the harm caused by the Afghan war significantly outweighs the good it has 
achieved, it can be considered disproportionate to its military advantage. 
B. Iraq Invasion (2003–Present) 
The Iraq War was commenced in 2003 to deter the threat posed by 
Iraq.337 The Iraq War was fought on the pretenses of preventive self-
                                                
328 See THRALL & GOEPNER, supra note 6, at 9 (discussing how the expansive 
counterterrorism campaign did not protect Americans from terrorist attacks). 
329 Torfeh, supra note 1.  
330 See Does the US Have an Exit-Strategy for Afghanistan?, TRTWORLD VIDEO: 
NEWS MAKERS, https://www.trtworld.com/video/the-newsmakers/does-the-us-
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Feb. 1, 2019) (discussing the 17-year-long war against the Taliban). 
331 See id.  
332 See generally THRALL & GOEPNER, supra note 6, at 9. (discussing how the 
number of Islamic-inspired terrorist groups and terror attacks in the Middle East 
and elsewhere has increased). 
333 NETA C. CRAWFORD, UPDATE ON THE HUMAN COSTS OF WAR FOR 
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 2–9 (2016), 
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/War%20in%20Af
ghanistan%20and%20Pakistan%20UPDATE_FINAL_corrected%20date.pdf (dis-
cussing the costs of war for Afghanistan); EMERGING TRENDS IN GLOBAL HEALTH 
73 (2008) (discussing how since the US invasion of Afghanistan, the opium mar-
kets has drastically grown); Why Afghanistan Is More Dangerous Than Ever, supra 
note 312 (discussing how violence in Afghanistan is getting worse since the US-led 
invasion in 2001); Does the US Have an Exit-Strategy for Afghanistan?, supra note 
330. 
334 REICH & DOMBROWSKI, supra note 305, at 36; Hasan, supra note 3.  
335 CRAWFORD, supra note 333; General Security Situation in Afghanistan and 
Events in Kabul, supra note 311 (discussing the state of Afghanistan after decades 
of warfare); Why Afghanistan Is More Dangerous Than Ever, supra note 312 (dis-
cussing how violence in Afghanistan is getting worse since the US-led invasion in 
2001). 
336 Torfeh, supra note 1.  
337 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 
Stat. 1498 (2002). 
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defense by the coalition partners of the US, the UK, Australia, and other 
states.338 However, preventive or preemptive self-defense is not recognized 
by the international law of using force.339 The UK and the US argued that 
the invasion was authorized by previous UNSC authorizations in the de-
fense of Kuwait’s 1990 invasion by Iraq340 and by the Disarmament Reso-
lution.341 However, Russia, France, and China issued a joint resolution in 
which they stated that previous resolutions did not authorize the invasion 
and a separate resolution was required to invade Iraq.342 Richard N. Haass, 
president of the Council on Foreign Relations, noted that, in the 2003 inter-
vention, Iraq did not pose any imminent threat to the US or any other coali-
tion partner states.343 The Iraq War was a war of choice, and it was waged 
without exhausting alternative options and without pursuing any American 
interests.344 The Iraq War was also primarily focused on the presence of 
WMDs. The US alleged that Iraq violated UNSC Resolution 1441 by pos-
sessing WMDs.345 
Some scholars believe that the Iraq War was an unjust war because it 
cannot be justified as a war for preemptive self-defense or as a humanitarian 
intervention.346 There were no WMDs found, which was the justification 
for the whole intervention.347 The intelligence reports for the WMDS were 
false.348 The conventional forces were already defeated. Similarly, despite 
the fact that the Iraqi people despised their leader, there was no compelling 
evidence to prove that they wanted intervention and exposure to the subse-
                                                
338 See id.  
339 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275 
(1963); see also ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 73 (1993); DINSTEIN, supra note 233, at 183 (citing 
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340 Press Release, United States Explanation of Vote on UN Security Council Reso-
lution 1441, U.N. Press Release 187 (Nov. 8, 2002); Press Release, United King-
dom Explanation of Vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1441, U.K. Press Re-
lease (Nov. 8, 2002). 
341 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1441 (Nov.  8, 2002). 
342 Joint Statement of China, France, and the Russian Federation on UN Security 
Council Resolution 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002). 
343 RICHARD N. HAASS, WAR OF NECESSITY, WAR OF CHOICE: A MEMOIR OF TWO 
IRAQ WARS 222 (2010). 
344 See id. at 233. 
345 Powell Presents US Case to Security Council of Iraq’s Failure to Disarm, UN 
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2003), https://news.un.org/en/story/2003/02/58372-powell-presents-
us-case-security-council-iraqs-failure-disarm. 
346 See McMahan, supra note 32, at 17–18. 
347 TRT World, 9/11 Anniversary: Seventeen Years Since Deadly Sept 11 Attacks, 
YOUTUBE (Sep. 11, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKqjLLS99Vk. 
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quent devastation.349 Kofi Annan said in 2004 that the Iraq invasion “was 
not in conformity with the UN Charter” and “was illegal”350 because the 
UNSC did not specifically authorize the Iraq invasion.351 Similarly, re-
nowned world politicians, including Russian president Vladimir Putin,352 
UK deputy Prime Minister John Prescott,353 and UK/Iraq Inquiry legal ex-
pert John Chilcot,354 have also expressed that the Iraq invasion lacked a le-
gal basis. Prescott further expressed that the Iraq War, as Kofi Annan point-
ed out, was unlawful and was only formulated to change the regime.355 
American legal expert Professor Marjorie Cohn356 and former US attorney 
general Ramsey Clark also believed that the Iraq War was a “war of aggres-
sion.”357 UK foreign secretary Jack Straw admitted that “regime change per 
se is no justification for military action” and it required a “fresh UN man-
date.”358 Similarly, the Dutch inquiry, headed by Netherlands Supreme 
Court president Williboard David, found that the Iraq invasion was unlaw-
ful.359 The actions to propel regime change had “no legal basis in the inter-
national law,”360 and UNSC Resolution 1441 could not have authorized the 
invasion: it was misinterpreted and misused.361 The International Commis-
sion of Jurists at the ICJ in Geneva also viewed the Iraq invasion as unlaw-
ful aggression without UNSC authorization.362 The German Federal Ad-
                                                
349 See McMahan, supra note 32, at 18. 
350 Lessons of Iraq War Underscore Importance of UN Charter – Annan, UN NEWS 
(Sept. 16, 2004), https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/09/115352-lessons-iraq-war-
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355 See id.  
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TO AL QAEDA (2013), https://www.globalresearch.ca/iraq-a-war-of-aggression-no-
wmds-no-connection-to-al-qaeda/5327548. 
357 Jim W. Dean, Ramsey Clark Leads Lawsuit Against US Iraq War Officials, 
VETERANS TODAY (June 18, 2015), 
https://www.veteranstoday.com/2015/06/18/ramsey-clark-leads-lawsuit-against-us-
iraq-war-officials/. 
358 Jack Straw, Straw’s Leaked Letter to Blair on Iraq, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2010), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jan/18/straw-leaked-letter-blair-
iraq. 
359 Report on the Dutch Committee of Inquiry on the War in Iraq, 57 NETH. INT’L 
L. REV. 81, 81–83 (2010). 
360 Id. at 83. 
361 Id. at 105.  
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ministrative Court also declared German participation in the Iraq War 
downright “illegal.”363 
1. Damage 
The Iraq War costs 190 million dollars per day.364 The war has caused 
the deaths of about a half-million people365 and it has completely destroyed 
the civilian infrastructure366 while terrorism and violence have increased in 
Iraq.367 Until 2003, there had been no suicide attacks in the history of 
Iraq.368 By 2015, Iraq had witnessed 1,892 suicide attacks on its soil.369 
About three million Iraqis are internally displaced,370 and about a quarter-
million are registered refugees.371 Approximately 8.7 million people need 
humanitarian assistance in Iraq.372 The invasion destroyed the Iraqi system 
of governance,373 and the US Army has still not pulled out of Iraq, despite 
not having given any justified reasons for remaining.374 
2. Application 
The military objective, to clear the threat of the WMDs, was based on 
false intelligence reports.375 In contrast, the regime change agenda was pur-
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http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GPI%202016%20Report_2.pd
f (charting Iraq as the third least peaceful country)). 
368 Hasan, supra note 3. 
369 See id. (explaining since 2003, Iraq had witnessed 1892 suicide attacks, and the 
video was made in 2015). 
370 The State of the World’s Human Rights — Iraq, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 22, 
2018), http://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1425072.html [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l. 
Rep. 2017/2018]. 
371 GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 366, at 9. 
372 U.N. Secretary-General, Security Council Resolution 2367 (2017), ¶ 84, U.N. 
Doc. S/2018/359 (Apr. 17, 2018).  
373 McMahan, supra note 32, at 18. 
374 See id. at 16–18. 
375 See Peter Taylor, Iraq War: The Greatest Intelligence Failure in Living 
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sued.376 The threat that “justified” invasion never existed377 and still, after 
seventeen years, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the deaths of a 
quarter-million people,378 millions more displaced,379 and the cost of tril-
lions of dollars,380 the military occupancy has no end in sight.381 Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the prolonged presence in Iraq382 – even where 
there was no threat383 – and the subsequent devastation due to this pres-
ence,384 exceeds its military advantage. That is why the Iraq War can be 
considered disproportionate to its military advantage. 
C. Syrian Intervention (2011–Present) 
Intervention in the Syrian civil war began in 2011.385 But the US and co-
alition partners started the invasion of Syria in 2015386 for two basic rea-
                                                                                                             
Memory, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/9937516/Iraq-war-
the-greatest-intelligence-failure-in-living-memory.html (explaining that Saddam 
Hussein did not have any WMDs and that there was a misrepresentation of such in 
the intelligence reports). 
376 Hans Blix, Blair Sold Iraq on WMD, But Only Regime Change Adds Up, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/dec/14/blair-iraq-
regime-change-inspections. 
377 See HAASS, supra note 343. 
378 Costs of War, supra note 365 (noting that 370,000 people have been killed as a 
direct result of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan). 
379 Amnesty Int’l. Rep. 2017/2018, supra note 370.  
380 See Hasan, supra note 3 (explaining that the war cost over 4 trillion dollars). 
381 See Torfeh, supra note 1 (discussing unending military invasion and control of 
the country). 
382 See Tuqa Khalid, U.S. Forces to Stay in Iraq as Long as Needed: Spokesman, 
REUTERS (Aug. 19, 2019), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-
usa/u-s-forces-to-stay-in-iraq-as-long-as-needed-spokesman-idUSKBN1L408A 
(explaining the reasoning for maintaining presence in Iraq during the war). 
383 See Blix, supra note 376 (explaining that there was no defiance in Iraq that 
could have justified the U.S.’s use of armed force). 
384 GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 366, at 5; POSITION ON RETURNS TO IRAQ , su-
pra note 366, at 3 (explaining the destruction and damage done to homes, water, 
sewage systems, schools, and government facilities) (citing Returns Begin to Iraq’s 
Fallujah, MUSINGS ON IRAQ (Sept. 29, 2016), 
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2016/09/returns-begin-to-iraqs-fallujah.html); 
Plight of Displaced In Iraq’s Anbar Province, MUSINGS ON IRAQ (Aug. 11, 2016), 
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2016/08/plight-of-displaced-in-iraqs-
anbar.html. 
385 A Look at US Involvement in Syria, NATIONAL (Apr. 14, 2018), 
http://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/a-look-at-us-involvement-in-syria-
1.721352.  
386 A Look at US Involvement in Syria’s Civil War, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 19, 
2018), http://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/12/19/a-look-at-us-
involvement-in-syrias-civil-war/ (discussing the first time Americans entered Syria 
and the partners they recruited). 
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sons. The first justification is the necessity of fighting non-state actors that 
pose a threat to Iraq387, at the Iraqis’ request, under preventive collective 
self-defense.388 The second justification is that intervention allows the 
fighting of ISIL/Daesh (a terrorist organization) under the WoT, in connec-
tion with the 9/11 events,389 because ISIL was once connected with Al 
Qaeda.390 However, the ICJ has explicitly maintained in the Nicaragua 
Case that there is no right to self-defense against non-state actors.391 It is 
pertinent to note here that the international community has long rejected the 
legality of the preventive self-defense.392 The international community be-
lieves that the coalition forces had no valid legal basis to use force in Syria 
without UNSC authorization.393 UNSC authorizations to use force in Syria 
have been repeatedly vetoed, in particular by Russia.394 
Apart from this military objective, the White House has admitted its 
agenda to seek regime change in Syria to serve its political interests by sup-
porting the rebels.395 It has also publicly acknowledged its support for re-
                                                
387 See Kevin Jon Heller, The Invention of the Khorasan Group and Non-Imminent 
Imminence, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/29/invention-khorasan-group-non-imminent-
imminence/. 
388 Federica D’Alessandra, Jus ad Bellum in Syria: The Meaning of the US Airpow-
er Campaign, HUM. RTS. L. WORKING GROUP NEWSLETTER (Int’l Bar Ass’n: Pub. 
and Prof’l Interest Div.), Mar. 2015, at 38. 
389 Zeke J. Miller, White House: Iraq War Vote: Obama Opposed Could Be Used 
for ISIS Strikes, TIME (Sept. 13, 2014), http://time.com/3362683/obama-isis-iraq-
syria-war-aumf/. 
390 Id.; Gregory A. Wagner, Warheads on Foreheads: The Applicability of the 9/11 
AUMF to the Threat of ISIL, 46 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 235, 255 (2015). 
391 Self-defense is not allowed against a neutral state in response to an armed attack 
by non-state actors, so long as the attack was not directed by a state. If a state or-
chestrated an armed attack through non-state actors, then there is a right to self-
defense against such a state. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 32 (June 27).  
392 See UNITED NATIONS, A MORE SECURE WORLD, OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, 
CHALLENGES AND SECURITY 63 (2004). 
393 See William Partlett, Does It Matter That Strikes Against Syria Violate Interna-
tional Law?, PURSUIT (April 16, 2018), 
https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/does-it-matter-that-strikes-against-syria-
violate-international-law; see Tess Bridgeman, When Does the Legal Basis for U.S. 
Forces in Syria Expire?, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/53810/legal-basis-u-s-forces-syria-expire/. 
394 See Russian Fed’n, UNSC VETO LIST, http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2019). 
395 See A Look at US Involvement in Syria, supra note 385; Hannah Allam, “Assad 
Must Go” Demand Should Go, Ex-White House Official Says, MIAMI HERALD 
(May 12, 2016), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/article77313747.html; Scott Wilson, Assad Must Go, Obama Says, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/assad-
must-go-obama-
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bels in Syria that fight the Bashar al-Assad regime.396 In turn, this support 
and fight against the state is destabilizing the region, destroying civilian 
property and essential infrastructure, and increasing violence and terrorism 
in Syria and the neighboring regions.397 
1. Damage 
About half-a-million people have been killed and about two million peo-
ple have been injured in Syria in six years.398 Millions more have been kid-
napped, tortured, and deprived of food, water, shelter, education and health 
care.399 Over five million Syrians have migrated as registered refugees,400 
and more than 7.6 million Syrians (about half its population by some esti-
mates401) have been displaced.402 Humanitarian laws are being violated by 
the government, ISIS, and the foreign-backed rebels.403 Food, electricity, 
water, housing, health care, the economy, governance, and infrastructure 
have collapsed.404 
                                                                                                             
says/2011/08/18/gIQAelheOJ_story.html?utm_term=.cd5b98800339. 
396 Adam Gallagher, How Will History Judge Obama’s Actions in Syria?, HILL 
(Feb. 21, 2017),  
https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/320199-how-will-history-
judge-obamas-actions-in-syria; see also Tara McKelvey, Arming Syrian Rebels: 
Where the US Went Wrong, BBC (Oct. 10, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33997408; Faysal Itani, The End of Ameri-
can Support for Syrian Rebels Was Inevitable, ATLANTIC (July 21, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/trump-syria-assad-
rebels-putin-cia/534540/; Obama Signs Secret Order to Aid Syria Rebels, AL 
JAZEERA (Nov. 18, 2013), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/08/20128264510724249.html. 
397 GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 366, at 4–6, 10–11. 
398 Id. at 4; International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing 
the Syrian Arab Republic, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 14–15 
(2017), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/59f365034.pdf.  
399 GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 366, at 4–5. 
400 Id. at 4. 
401 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 
CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO PEOPLE FLEEING THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 
24 (2017), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/59f365034.pdf. 
402 AL MARSAD, The Syrian Situation - International Humanitarian Law Violations 
and the Call for Justice: A Summary, http://golan-marsad.org/wp-
content/uploads/The-Syrian-Situation-International-Law-Violations-and-the-Call-
for-Justice-A-Summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).  
403 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, supra note 401, at 15–23 (dis-
cussing government forces, ISIS, anti-government armed groups, and people’s pro-
tection units as violators of humanitarian law). 
404 Id. at 28 (citing The Economic and Social Conseqences of the Conflict in Syria, 
WORLD BANK (July 10, 2017), http://bit.ly/2A6nTgx). 
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2. Application 
To analyze the proportionality of this war, it is interesting to note that the 
use of force in Syria does not have just cause under international law.405 In 
respect to the military objectives to fight terrorists in Syria, arms-support to 
rebels406 has increased violence and terrorism in Syria rather than decreased 
it.407 Past experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq are sufficient to prove the 
foreseeability of this increase in violence and terrorism to a reasonable 
commander with intelligence. There is no good achieved in Syria. The 
deaths of civilians, damage to the infrastructure, and destabilization of the 
region are serious harms,408 compared to no benefit achieved. Moreover, 
the support to rebels,409 the regime change agenda, and the targeting of the 
government410 are also in excess of the direct military objectives. There-
fore, it can be rightly concluded that because the harms caused were rea-
sonably foreseeable, and they outweighed any good achieved, the Syrian 
war is disproportionate to its military advantage. 
CONCLUSION 
In the wars in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan under the WoT, the military 
objective has been to fight terrorism.411 The legality and justification of 
fighting these wars are debated, questioned, and challenged by Congress it-
self, as well by renowned scholars and countries around the world.412 More 
                                                
405 Partlett, supra note 393; see Bridgeman, supra note 393. 
406 Gallagher, supra note 396; see also McKelvey, supra note 396. 
407 See Michael Shank & Kate Gould, Let’s Keep Syria’s Blood Off America’s 
Hands, USA TODAY (July 23, 2013), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/07/23/arming-syrian-rebels-civil-
war-column/2578667/. 
408 See MARTA BITORSOLI, AL-MARSAD, THE SYRIAN SITUATION: 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATES AND THE CALL FOR JUSTICE 7 
(2016), http://golan-marsad.org/wp-content/uploads/Syrian-case-ICC-Report.pdf; 
GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 366, at 4. 
409 Gallagher, supra note 396; Itani, supra note 396; Mark Mazzetti, Adam Gold-
man, & Michael S. Schmidt, Behind the Sudden Death of a $1 Billion Secret C.I.A. 
War in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-syria-rebel-arm-train-
trump.html; McKelvey, supra note 396; Obama Signs Secret Order to Aid Syria 
Rebels, supra note 396.  
410 See Allam, supra note 395 
411 See Authorization for Use of Military Force 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224. 
412 See, e.g., H. Amend. 1216, 114th Cong. (2016); H. Amend. 482, 114th Cong. 
(2015); H Amend. 484 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Con. Res. 55, 114th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (2015); H.R. 1303, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. (2015); H.R. 1304, 114th Cong., 
1st Sess. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 30, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. (2015); S. 526, 114th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (2015); Wagner, supra note 390, at 256 (citing Jack Goldsmith, 
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notably, support for rebels in other states and regime change agendas are 
seen not only as acts of aggression413 that destabilize nations and increase 
terrorism but also as counterproductive414 actions that exceed the military 
objectives. The harm caused by these wars includes the destruction of civil-
ian infrastructure,415 the deprivation of basic human needs, such as food, 
water, electricity, education, and health care,416 the deaths of millions of in-
nocent civilians,417 the increase of violence and terrorism,418 the destabili-
zation of regions, and migration crises of millions of refugees and the dis-
placement of millions more.419 About 1.17 million reports of war crimes 
have been submitted to the ICJ.420 The relevant promised benefit – to de-
crease terrorism and increase security421 – has not been effectively 
achieved. Rather, these wars have been considered proven cases of counter-
productive missions.422 Therefore, it can be concluded that the devastation 
due to military actions423 in these wars was foreseeable to a reasonable 
commander. These wars have caused a great deal of harm to several coun-
                                                                                                             
History Suggests That Congress Will Only Authorize Force Against the Islamic 
State if the President Proposes and Pushes for an Authorization (or Screws Up 
Unilateral Force Badly), LAWFARE (Oct. 7, 2014), 
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(2017). 
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Shelbourne, supra note 155. 
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421 Authorization for Use of Military Force 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224. 
422 See Pierce Rand, Back to the Congressional Drawing Board: Inapplicability of 
the AUMF to Al-Shabaab and Other New Faces of Terrorism, 37 LOYOLA L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 117, 137 (2015). 
423 BITORSOLI, supra note 408, at 1; DANISH IMMIGRATION SERV., THE KURDISTAN 
REGION OF IRAQ: ACCESS, POSSIBILITY OF PROTECTION, SECURITY AND 
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION 11 (2016), 
https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/4B4E8C12-84B7-4ACB-8553-
5E0218C5689A/0/FactfindingreportKurdistanRegionofIraq11042016.pdf; 
GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 376, at 1; POSITION ON RETURNS TO IRAQ , supra 
note 366, at 2; Afghanistan, supra note 309; Amnesty Int’l. Rep. 2017/2018, supra 
note 370, at 202–05; General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Ka-
bul, supra note 309; Hasan, supra note 3; Why Afghanistan Is More Dangerous 
Than Ever, supra note 312. 
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tries; the migration crises and increases in terrorism have affected the world 
and decreased Western security. Moreover, they have completely destroyed 
and destabilized several nations.424 The good has not been effectively 
achieved and the wars have proven to be counterproductive.425 These wars 
have caused more harm than they have achieved relevant good. Therefore, 
they can be considered to be disproportionate to their direct military ad-
vantage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
424 BITORSOLI, supra note 408, at 1; DANISH IMMIGRATION SERV., supra note 423; 
GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 366, at 1; POSITION ON RETURNS TO IRAQ, supra 
note 366, at 2; Afghanistan, supra note 309; Amnesty Int’l. Rep. 2017/2018, supra 
note 370, at 202–05; General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Ka-
bul, supra note 309; Hasan, supra note 3; Why Afghanistan Is More Dangerous 
Than Ever, supra note 312. 
425 THRALL & GOEPNER, supra note 6, at 2. 
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